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Abstract
We analyze relations between several types of interest rate control rules and
equilibrium determinacy using a two-country model featuring preference and
production parameters that may di®er between countries, in which two kinds
of goods are tradable. Such heterogeneity may violate the Taylor principle,
which implies that aggressive monetary policy is desirable to attain determi-
nate equilibrium. We evaluate the forms of interest rate control needed to
attain macroeconomic stability in consideration of the heterogeneity.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we analyze equilibrium determinacy in a two-country model. Each
country has asymmetric production technologies and preferences, and the monetary
authorities may adopt di®erent types of interest rate control rules.
Numerous studies investigate the stabilization e®ect of interest rate control rules
utilizing small country models in open economy, as well as closed economy settings
like Benhabib et. al. (2001). For example, Chang, Chen, Lai and Shaw (2008)
assume an AK growth economy and a generalized Taylor rule in which the central
bank controls the nominal interest rate in response to not only in°ation but also the
growth rate of income. 1 They show that the number of equilibrium paths is less
than one, that is, equilibrium is determinate or source. 2
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1999), Kam (2004, 2007), and Zanna (2003, 2004) ex-
amine small-open economy models that include Taylor-type monetary policy and
production using only labor under conditions of sticky prices. Except for Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1999), these authors clearly distinguish non-traded from tradable goods.
Economies in Airaudo and Zanna (2004, 2005) 3 are also of this type, but they as-
sume perfect competition and °exible prices. If continuous-time setting is used in
their models, we only recon¯rm the well-known results established in closed-economy
models: the Taylor principle holds, which implies that interest rate control with an
aggressive response to the in°ation rate generates determinate equilibrium. They
utilize discrete-time models in order to investigate how the timings of monetary
dynamics 4 a®ect macroeconomic stability. These small-open economy models are
1Such a monetary policy rule is also formalized in Fujisaki and Mino (2007).
2However, we should note that they assume a sticky nominal interest rate.
3A liquidity trap in which the nominal interest rate cannot be negative is considered in Airaudo
and Zanna (2004).
4For instance, the monetary authority controls current nominal interest rate in response to either
the contemporaneous or a forward-looking in°ation rate. In addition, money a®ecting utility is
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sophisticated and yield many interesting results, but they do not clarify the e®ect
of interaction among countries on equilibrium determinacy.
On the other hand, the role of interest rate control in a global economy model
featuring two countries has also been extensively discussed in literature for exam-
ining the international economy where the policy cooperation between countries is
required. In particular, many researchers, such as Leith and Wren-Levis (2009),
5 analyze New Keynesian models with sticky prices and monopolistic competition
based on Clarida, Gal¶³ and Gertler (2002). They distinguish domestically produced
goods from foreign-produced goods and the money in the utility is independent
of consumption. Moreover, McKnight (2007a, 2007b) and McKnight and Mihailov
(2007) investigate various types of two-country models by considering capital, timing
of money held by household, or trade openness. However, they generally conclude
that the Taylor principle tends to hold. They may have reached this conclusion as
they assume parameters about preferences and production in these models to be the
same in both countries.
Ono (2006) considers a two-country economy using a simple model in which two
kinds of goods are tradable, money is additively separable with consumption in the
utility, production is linear with regard to labor, and unemployment can emerge. He
focuses on exogenous monetary policy around the steady state such that the growth
rate of real money balances equals the de°ation rate; that is, nominal money holdings
are constant.
We revise Ono's (2006) model by using a Taylor-type policy of interest control.
We specify that money holdings may not be additively-separable with consumption,
prices are °exible, structural unemployment cannot occur, and production functions
the one held by household either before entering or after exiting the shop.
5The other examples are Batini, Levine and Pearlman (2004), Benigno and Benigno (2006),
Bullard and Schalling (2006), De Fiore and Liu (2005), Ferrero et al. (2008), Gunter (2009), and
Wang (2006).
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involve labor and ¯xed productive factors. 6 In contrast to the existing two-country
models, we construct a two-country model with heterogeneity. In this paper, het-
erogeneity pertains to the monetary authority's response to the domestic in°ation
rate (and other target variables such as output) via interest rate controls, and to
parameters such as elasticities of labor in production and of intertemporal substi-
tution. To simplify macroeconomic dynamics via equivalence of real interest rates
between two countries, a law of one price for all goods is needed. However, this is
not a natural assumption under a two-country model in which tradable and non-
traded goods exist simultaneously, as in small-open economy models. If all goods
are tradable as in Ono (2006) and our paper, we can naturally derive the equivalence
of real interest rates. Therefore, we can easily interpret our analytical results and
garner lessons for monetary policy.
We show that an appropriate cooperation of interest rate controls is required
to stabilize a world economic system, primarily because controlling heterogeneity of
preferences and technology is beyond a central bank's capacity. This does not neces-
sarily mean that central banks in both countries should aggressively control nominal
interest rates in response to in°ation. Pursuing such policies can generate indeter-
minacy, because liberalization is a two-edged sword in that unstable economies may
become stable and vice versa. In addition, when altering interest rates, monetary
authorities should be cautious in their response to in°ation, output, or depreciation
in exchange rates of their domestic currencies. In particular, the e®ect on macroe-
conomic stability from di®erences in production between the two countries in our
model depends on whether central banks use output for controlling interest rates.
6This follows Airaudo and Zanna (2005), but they do not claim the ¯xed productive factor so
that pro¯t can be non-zero. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1999) mention this shortcoming and assume
that output involves labor and a ¯xed factor of production.
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2 The Model
2.1 Households in Country 1
We assume a global economy of two countries, Country 1 and Country 2. Each
produces only one kind of goods but can consume both goods by importing the
other. First, we see the economic structure of Country 1 which produces Goods 1.
We denote the consumer price index (CPI) as p, the CPI-in°ation rate as ¼, and
the relative price of Goods 1 to Goods 2 ~P as
p ´
µ
P1
®
¶®µ
P2
1¡ ®
¶1¡®
; ¼ = ®¼1 + (1¡ ®)¼2 (1)
~P =
P1
P2
; (2)
where ¼1 ´
_P1
P1
µ
resp. ¼2 ´
_P2
P2
¶
is the in°ation rate of the price of goods produced
in Country 1 P1 (resp. in Country 2 P2) expressed in the domestic currency.
The production function of Goods 1 is
y1 = (l1)
µ1(L1)1¡µ1 ; 0 < µ1 < 1;
where l1 is the quantity of labor employed in producing Goods 1 y1, µ1 is the elas-
ticity of labor employed in production and L1 is a ¯xed factor of production. This
speci¯cation is based on Airaudo and Zanna (2005), who do not, however, stipulate
the ¯xed productive factor so that pro¯t can be non-zero. Introducing a ¯xed factor
of production into the model, as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1999), is bene¯cial in
explaining situations of zero pro¯t. In the following, we suppose that rent from the
factor is distributed to households and that L1 = 1. Therefore, income distribution
is described as follows;
y1 = wl1 + h;
where w is a real wage equal to the marginal production of labor
µ1y1
l1
and h =
(1¡ µ1)y1 is the rent from the ¯xed factor.
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The household budget constraint in nominal terms is
_B + _M = RB + P1(y1 ¡ c1)¡ P2c2;
where c1 and c2 are consumption of goods produced by Countries 1 and 2 respec-
tively, R nominal interest rate, and B and M are the notations in nominal terms
of b bonds and m real money balances severally. (For simplicity, we assume that
lump-sum tax is zero. ) We can describe this equation as
_B + _M ¡RB + T
P2
p
p
=
p
P2
( _a+ ¼a¡R(a¡m) + ¿);
because
_B + _M
p
=
_A
p
= _a+ ¼a:
Using
p
P2
=
~P®
®®(1¡ ®)1¡®
from (1) and (2), we obtain
_a = (R¡ ¼)a¡Rm+ ®®(1¡ ®)1¡® ~P¡®[ ~P (y1 ¡ c1)¡ c2]; (3)
where a ´ b+m denotes real ¯nancial assets.
The optimization problem of a representative household in Country 1 is
max
Z 1
0
u(c;m; l1)e
¡½tdt; ½ > 0;
subject to (3), where the instantaneous utility is
u(c;m; l1) =
(c°m1¡°)1¡¾
1¡ ¾ + Ã(1¡ l1); 0 < ° < 1; ¾ > 0; Ã > 0;
(1¡ l1) leisure, ½ the time discount rate, ¾ the inverse of intertemporal elasticity of
substitution (IES), and c is the consumption aggregator given by
c = (c1)
®(c2)
1¡®; 0 < ® < 1; (4)
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The Hamiltonian function is
H = (c
°m1¡°)1¡¾
1¡ ¾ + Ã(1¡ l1)+
¸f(R¡ ¼)a¡Rm+ ®®(1¡ ®)1¡® ~P¡®[ ~P (y1 ¡ c1)¡ c2]g;
where ¸ denotes the shadow value of assets. The ¯rst-order conditions are
°®
(c°m1¡°)1¡¾
c1
= ®®(1¡ ®)1¡® ~P 1¡®¸; (5)
°(1¡ ®)(c
°m1¡°)1¡¾
c2
= ®®(1¡ ®)1¡® ~P¡®¸; (6)
(1¡ °)(c
°m1¡°)1¡¾
m
= ¸R; (7)
®®(1¡ ®)1¡® ~P 1¡®¸µ1(l1)¡(1¡µ1) = Ã; (8)
_¸ = [½+ ¼ ¡R]¸; (9)
together with the transversality condition, lim
t!1
e¡½t¸tat = 0. These equations sev-
erally show the equivalence of marginal bene¯ts and costs for consumption goods,
money, labor, and asset holdings. We can rewrite them as follows:
c2
c1
=
1¡ ®
®
~P ; (10)
m =
1¡ °
°
c
R
; (11)
°®
(c°m1¡°)1¡¾
c1
=
Ã
µ1(l1)¡(1¡µ1)
: (12)
These respectively imply the optimal conditions for the constant ratio of nomi-
nal consumption expenditures, optimal demand for real money holdings, and the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure as the residual of
labor for producing Goods 1.
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2.2 Households in Country 2
The economic structure of Country 2, which produces Goods 2, is the same as that
of Country 1. Therefore, when parameters ½, ®, ° and Ã are the same as in Country
1, the Hamiltonian of Country 2's household maximization problem is
H¤ = ((c
¤)°(m¤)1¡°)1¡¾
¤
1¡ ¾¤ + Ã(1¡ l
¤
2) + ¸
¤f(R¤ ¡ ¼¤)a¤ ¡R¤m¤
+ ®®(1¡ ®)1¡® ~P ¤¡®[¡ ~P ¤c¤1 + (y¤2 ¡ c¤2)]g:
We represent variables and parameters for Country 2 with asterisks. For example,
the consumption index is described as c¤ = (c¤1)
®(c¤2)
1¡®. The method of translating
the nominal terms of the budget constraint into real terms is similar to that for
Country 1. Variables for the price level in Country 2 are
p¤ ´
µ
P ¤1
®
¶®µ
P ¤2
1¡ ®
¶1¡®
=
µ
"P1
®
¶®µ
"P2
1¡ ®
¶1¡®
= "p; ~P ¤ =
"P2
"P1
= ~P ; (13)
where " is the nominal exchange rate. These equations imply that the law of one
price holds. For example, the price of Goods 1 is transcribed as P1 yen in Japan and
P ¤1 =
P1
"
dollars in the United States. This is an acceptable assumption because
both goods are tradable.
Goods 2 is produced by technology such that
y¤2 = (l
¤
2)
µ2(L¤2)1¡µ2 ; 0 < µ2 < 1;
where µ¤2 is the elasticity of labor employed in production and L¤2 is a ¯xed factor of
production for Goods 2. Again, we assume that rent from the factor is distributed
to households and that L¤2 = 1 for simplicity. Then, income distribution is described
as follows;
y¤2 = w
¤l¤2 + h
¤;
where w¤ is a real wage equal to the marginal production of labor
µ¤2y
¤
2
l¤2
and h¤ is
the rent from the ¯xed factor.
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Denoting ¸¤ as the shadow value of assets in Country 2, we can write the ¯rst-
order conditions as follows:
°®
((c¤)°(m¤)1¡°)1¡¾
¤
c¤1
= ®®(1¡ ®)1¡® ~P 1¡®¸¤; (14)
°(1¡ ®)((c
¤)°(m¤)1¡°)1¡¾
¤
c¤2
= ®®(1¡ ®)1¡® ~P¡®¸¤; (15)
(1¡ °)((c
¤)°(m¤)1¡°)1¡¾
¤
m¤
= ¸¤R¤; (16)
®®(1¡ ®)1¡® ~P¡®¸¤µ¤2(l¤2)¡(1¡µ
¤
2) = Ã; (17)
_¸¤ = [½+ ¼¤ ¡R¤]¸¤: (18)
These can be rewritten such that
c¤2
c¤1
=
1¡ ®
®
~P ; (19)
m¤ =
1¡ °
°
c¤
R¤
; (20)
°(1¡ ®)((c
¤)°(m¤)1¡°)1¡¾
¤
c¤2
=
Ã
µ¤2(l
¤
2)
¡(1¡µ¤2)
: (21)
These equations are similar to (5)¡(12), except that labor is used in the production
of Goods 2, and the transversality condition is lim
t!1
e¡½t¸¤ta
¤
t = 0. .
2.3 Monetary Policy and Interest-Rate Conditions
As in Taylor (1993), we suppose the central bank in each country controls the
nominal interest rate in response to its aggregate domestic rate of in°ation;
R = R(¼) = ´¼(¼ ¡ ¹¼) + ¹R; ´¼ ¸ 0; (22)
R¤ = R¤(¼¤) = ´¤¼(¼
¤ ¡ ¹¼¤) + ¹R¤; ´¤¼ ¸ 0; (23)
where ¹¼ and ¹¼¤ are the non-negative target rates of in°ation in Countries 1 and 2,
respectively, and ¹R = ¹¼ + ½ and ¹R¤ = ¹¼¤ + ½ around the steady state which implies
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that
_¸
¸
=
_¸¤
¸¤
= 0 as con¯rmed from Equations (9) and (18). We rewrite (22) and
(23) in the following manner:
¼ = ¼(R); ¼0(R) =
1
´¼
;
¼¤ = ¼¤(R¤); ¼¤
0
(R¤) =
1
´¤¼
:
Under this formulation, we de¯ne active (resp. passive) monetary policy as ´¼ > 1
or ´¤¼ > 1 (resp. ´¼ < 1 or ´
¤
¼ < 1), which indicates that the real interest rate
is an increasing (resp. a decreasing) function of in°ation and thus of the nominal
interest rate. Heterogeneity can be assumed in the monetary authority's adjustment
of the interest rate in response to in°ation as well as parameters of preferences and
production. That is, we allow ´¼ 6= ´¤¼.
The interest-parity condition is
R = ²+R¤; (24)
where ² ´ _"
"
is the rate of devaluation in the nominal exchange rate ". From the
law of one price (13),
¼ = ²+ ¼¤; (25)
and thus we obtain a non-arbitrage condition
r = R¡ ¼ = R¤ ¡ ¼¤; (26)
where r denotes the real interest rate common to both countries. 7 Therefore,
_¸
¸
=
_¸¤
¸¤
= ½+ ¼ ¡R = ½¡ r (27)
holds from (9) and (18). This means that the ratio between shadow values ¸ and
¸¤ is a positive constant © > 0 determined by initial assets a0 and a¤0, ¸ = ©¸
¤.
7This condition is revised if there are non-traded goods. In such a case, the law of one price is
not generally plausible.
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We ¯nd that the nominal interest rate in Country 2 R¤, the currency devaluation
rate ², and the real rate of interest r are functions of R:
R¤ = R¤(R); R¤
0
(R) =
´¤¼(´¼ ¡ 1)
´¼(´¤¼ ¡ 1)
;
r = r(R); r0(R) =
´¼ ¡ 1
´¼
:
² = ²(R); ²0(R) =
´¤¼ ¡ ´¼
´¼(´¤¼ ¡ 1)
;
For example, if both central banks adopt passive monetary policy and the response
to in°ation is stronger in Country 2 (that is, ´¼ < ´
¤
¼ < 1), then
R¤
0
(R) > 0; ²0(R) < 0 and r0(R) < 0:
When in°ation in Country 1 decreases, nominal interest rates in both countries
fall and their common real rate of interest should rise in order to satisfy the non-
arbitrage condition (26). The extent of decline in the nominal interest rate as the
opportunity cost for holding money is comparatively larger in Country 2. This leads
to the depreciation of Country 1's currency (that is, ² increases), according to the
interest-parity condition (24) or the law of one price (25). In contrast, R¤
0
(R) = 1
and ²0(R) = 0 holds under ´¼ = ´¤¼ since exchange rate °uctuation via heterogeneity
of monetary policy does not occur.
3 Equilibrium Determinacy
3.1 Equilibrium
We see the e®ect of heterogeneity on macroeconomic stability by allowing that ¾ 6=
¾¤ and µ1 6= µ¤2. From Equations (5)¡(21), important variables can be described as
functions of R and ¸ in Country 1 (R¤ and ¸¤ in Country 2):
c = C(R(1¡°)(1¡¾)¸)¡ 1¾ ; (28)
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m =
1¡ °
°
CR¡ 1¡°+°¾¾ ¸¡ 1¾ ; (29)
c¤ = C¤((R¤)(1¡°)(1¡¾¤)¸¤)¡ 1¾¤ ; (30)
m¤ =
1¡ °
°
C¤(R¤)¡ 1¡°+°¾
¤
¾¤ (¸¤)¡
1
¾ ; (31)
where
C ´ [°1¡(1¡°)(1¡¾)(1¡ °)(1¡°)(1¡¾)] 1¾ and C¤ ´ [°1¡(1¡°)(1¡¾¤)(1¡ °)(1¡°)(1¡¾¤)] 1¾¤ :
Respective market equilibria of Goods 1 and 2 are
y1 = c1 + c
¤
1; y
¤
2 = c2 + c
¤
2: (32)
Using (10), (19), and (32), we derive
y¤2
y1
=
c¤2
c¤1
=
c2
c1
=
1¡ ®
®
~P: (33)
Then, from (4) or c¤ = (c¤1)
®(c¤2)
1¡® and (32),
c1 = c
µ
y1
y¤2
¶1¡®
; c¤1 = c
¤
µ
y1
y¤2
¶1¡®
: (34)
c2 = c
µ
y1
y¤2
¶¡®
; c¤2 = c
¤
µ
y1
y¤2
¶¡®
: (35)
Combining (32) with (34) or (35), we obtain
(y1)
®(y¤2)
1¡® = c+ c¤: (36)
The sum of consumption indices in the two countries is equal to the "production
index", which is similar to the consumption index. In addition, from (7), (16), and
(33),
c¤
c
=
c¤1
c1
=
c¤2
c2
; (37)
(c°m1¡°)1¡¾
((c¤)°(m¤)1¡°)1¡¾¤
m¤
m
=
¸R
¸¤R¤
; (38)
~P
¸
¸¤
=
µ¤2(l
¤
2)
¡(1¡µ¤2)
µ1(l1)¡(1¡µ1)
=
®
1¡ ®
(c°m1¡°)1¡¾
((c¤)°(m¤)1¡°)1¡¾¤
c¤2
c1
: (39)
11
From (33) and (39), we acquire
l1 =
®
1¡ ®
µ1
µ¤2
¸
¸¤
l¤2; (40)
and thus
~P =
µ
®
1¡ ®
¶1¡µ1µµ¤2
µ1
¶µ1µ ¸
¸¤
¶¡µ1
(l¤2)
µ¤2¡µ1 : (41)
Then, respective labor supplies in the two countries are functions of ¸ and ¸¤:
l1 =
®
1¡ ®
µ1
µ¤2
[¡¸1¡(1¡®)µ
¤
2 (¸¤)(1¡®)µ
¤
2 ]
1
1¡µ¤2+®(µ¤2¡µ1) ; (42)
l¤2 = [¡¸
®µ1(¸¤)1¡®µ1 ]
1
1¡µ¤2+®(µ¤2¡µ1) ; (43)
where
¡ ´ ®
®(1¡ ®)1¡®µ¤2
Ã
µ
®
1¡ ®
¶¡®(1¡µ1)µµ1
µ¤2
¶®µ1
:
Therefore, the relative price function becomes
~P =
P1
P2
=
µ
®
1¡ ®
¶1¡µ1µµ¤2
µ1
¶µ1
¡
µ¤2¡µ1
1¡µ¤2+®(µ¤2¡µ1)¸
¡ µ1(1¡µ
¤
2)
1¡µ¤2+®(µ¤2¡µ1) (¸¤)
µ¤2(1¡µ1)
1¡µ¤2+®(µ¤2¡µ1) ;
and then
_~P
~P
=
µ¤2 ¡ µ1
1¡ µ¤2 + ®(µ¤2 ¡ µ1)
_¸
¸
=
µ1 ¡ µ¤2
1¡ µ¤2 + ®(µ¤2 ¡ µ1)
(r ¡ ½)
from (27). Note that
1¡ µ¤2 + ®(µ¤2 ¡ µ1) = ®(1¡ µ1) + (1¡ ®)(1¡ µ2) 2 (0; 1);
because 0 < µ1 < 1 and 0 < µ2 < 1. A higher real interest rate implies a lower
shadow value of assets, because higher r indicates a larger gain per asset and thus
the value of one unit of asset declines. This occurs because the need to generate
more foreign demand in order to accumulate assets subsides and production in both
countries therefore decreases. From (27), (42), and (43),
_l1
l1
=
_l¤2
l¤2
=
1
1¡ µ¤2 + ®(µ¤2 ¡ µ1)
_¸
¸
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holds. That is, the growth rate of labor as a productive factor is equal between the
two countries, since marginal utilities of leisure equal the marginal productivities of
labor for the optimality shown in (8) and (17) and are constant in both countries.
When µ1 < µ
¤
2, the extent of decrease in supply of Goods 2 with diminishing labor
is larger, and then the relative price of Goods 1 decreases since the ratio between
nominal output in the two countries is constant from (33).
The equilibrium condition for bond market is
b+ b¤ = 0;
since bonds are IOUs between the home and foreign households. Then, combining
this condition, households' budget constraint, and equilibrium of goods market, we
acquire the equilibrium condition for money which holds due to the Walras' law:
_m+ _m¤ = ¡¼m¡ ¼¤m¤:
3.2 System Equation
As in (28)¡(31), consumption indices c and c¤ are functions of the nominal interest
rate and shadow values in their respective countries. However, we have already
shown that ¸ = ©¸¤ and R¤ = R¤(R). From equation (36), the dynamic system
equation is ultimately a function of one jump variable R,
_R = ¡ ¸(R)
¸0(R)
[R¡ ¼(R)¡ ½]; (44)
where
¸0(R) =
d¸
dR
= ¡
c
(1¡ °)(1¡ ¾)
¾
+ c¤
(1¡ °)(1¡ ¾¤)
¾¤
R¤
0
(R)R
R¤(R)
c
¾
+
c¤
¾¤
+ (c+ c¤)
·
1
1¡ µ¤2 + ®(µ¤2 ¡ µ1)
¡ 1
¸ ¸
R
;
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because di®erentiating equation (36), we obtain
(y1)
®(y¤2)
1¡®
·
1
1¡ µ¤2 + ®(µ¤2 ¡ µ1)
¡ 1
¸ _¸
¸
=
¡ (1¡ °)(1¡ ¾)
¾
c
_R
R
¡ c
¾
_¸
¸
¡ (1¡ °)(1¡ ¾
¤)
¾¤
c¤
_R¤
R¤
¡ c
¤
¾¤
_¸¤
¸¤
: (45)
We evaluate Equation (44) around the steady state in order to examine local
determinacy:
_RRjss = ¡ ¸(
¹R)
¸0( ¹R)
[1¡ ¼0( ¹R)];
where variables with an upper bar denote the steady-state values given the target
rates of in°ation, ¹¼ and ¹¼¤. Equilibrium determinacy where the equilibrium path is
unique is realized if _RRjss > 0. It implies a stable economy in that non-fundamental
expectations cannot a®ect economic °uctuations. Otherwise, equilibrium is indeter-
minate as multiple equilibrium paths emerge. We conclude that
sign[ _RRjss] = sign
2664
´¼ ¡ 1
´¼
c( ¹R)
(1¡ °)(1¡ ¾)
¾
+ c¤( ¹R)
(1¡ °)(1¡ ¾¤)
¾¤
¹R
R¤( ¹R)
´¤¼(´¼ ¡ 1)
´¼(´¤¼ ¡ 1)
3775 ;
and thus we roughly summarize the results of equilibrium determinacy in the fol-
lowing propositions and Table 1:
Proposition 1 If the value of IES is 1 in either country, the other country's central
bank can make equilibrium determinate by invoking a policy rule such that
´¼ ¡ 1
1¡ ¾ > 0µ
or
´¤¼ ¡ 1
1¡ ¾¤ > 0
¶
.
Proposition 2 When ¾ < 1 and ¾¤ < 1 (resp. ¾ > 1 and ¾¤ > 1) holds, both
countries should adopt an active (resp. passive) policy in order to assure determinate
equilibrium.
Proposition 3 In situations where (1 ¡ ¾)(1 ¡ ¾¤) < 0, determinate equilibrium
is generated by a combination of passive interest-rate control in the country pre-
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senting an IES value below 1 and aggressive monetary policy in the other country.
Indeterminacy inevitably emerges under the converse combination of policies.
When ¾ = ¾¤ = 1, that is, consumption and money are additively separable
in both countries, consumption indices are decreasing functions of only the shadow
value of assets from (28) and (30). Therefore, the value is uniquely determined by
equilibrium in the goods market even if it does not approach the steady state:
Proposition 4 If ¾ = ¾¤ = 1, equilibrium is necessarily determinate regardless of
monetary policy.
3.3 Implications
Propositions 1 and 4 are similar to the results under the one-country model or the
economy with endowment in Benhabib et al. (2001). In addition, from Propo-
sitions 2 and 3, we ¯nd that economic liberalization can overcome indeterminacy
in one country, but a stable economy may owe the risk of instability by the trade
liberalization. Such various conclusions via preference do not appear in the liter-
ature involving two-country models, which often assume that preferences between
consumption and money are additively separable.
Let us consider these results intuitively. Suppose that ¾ < 1 and ¾¤ > 1 (i.e.,
consumption and money are complements in Country 1 and substitutes in Country
2), and that the in°ation rate in Country 1 subsides.
If only Country 1 adopts passive monetary policy, its real interest rate rises. The
productions relative to consumption for asset accumulation falls as in the previous
subsection, but consumption in both countries increases with higher in°ation in
Country 2. Therefore, Equation (36) does not hold, which implies that equilibrium
is indeterminate.
When both central banks adopt active monetary policy, the real and nominal
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interest rates decline in both countries. Consumption increases in Country 1, while
decreases in Country 2. In addition, production becomes larger relative to consump-
tion in the two countries. Therefore, whether Equation (36) is satis¯ed depends on
the heterogeneity of not only preference parameters but also monetary policy. De-
terminacy tends to hold if the response of interest-rate control in Country 1 ´¼ is
higher, because a large increase in consumption in Country 1 through monetary
policy is required for equilibrium in the goods-market. This is similar under passive
interest rate control in both monetary authorities, but ´¼ should be weaker in or-
der to restrain the e®ect of decreasing consumption in Country 1. Since preference
parameters cannot be controlled by monetary authorities and inequality between ¾
and ¾¤ may emerge in general, naive adjustment of interest rate control is needed for
a stable economy in cases where either determinacy or indeterminacy may emerge.
To check the robustness of the results, for example, in which heterogeneity of
production does not a®ect the results in this section, we formulate other types of a
Taylor rule in the next section.
4 Other Types of Interest Rate Controls
4.1 Response to Depreciation
Because currency depreciation has the same e®ect as higher in°ation under the law
of one price, we consider a monetary policy rule such that nominal interest rates
also respond to the depreciation rate ² as in Ball (1998):
R = R(¼) = ´¼(¼ ¡ ¹¼) + ´²(²¡ ¹²) + ¹R; ´¼ ¸ 0; ´² ¸ 0; (46)
R¤ = R¤(¼¤) = ´¤¼(¼
¤ ¡ ¹¼¤)¡ ´¤² (²¡ ¹²) + ¹R¤; ´¤¼ ¸ 0; ´¤² ¸ 0: (47)
This type of monetary policy using the exchange rate is peculiar to an open economy.
Utilizing this method, we can stabilize a multi-country global economy, in which each
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is unstable under the closed economy if the monetary authority uses only in°ation
as its meridian for setting policy.
From this formulation, the variables as functions of R can be described in the
followings:
¼ = ¼(R); ¼0(R) =
´¤¼ ¡ 1 + ´¤² + ´²
´¼(´¤¼ ¡ 1) + ´¼´¤² + ´¤¼´²
;
² = ²(R); ²0(R) =
´¤¼ ¡ ´¼
´¼(´¤¼ ¡ 1) + ´¼´¤² + ´¤¼´²
:
R¤ = R¤(R); R¤
0
(R) =
´¤¼(´¼ ¡ 1) + ´¼´¤² + ´¤¼´²
´¼(´¤¼ ¡ 1) + ´¼´¤² + ´¤¼´²
;
r0(R) = 1¡ ¼0(R) = (´
¤
¼ ¡ 1)(´¼ ¡ 1) + ´¤² (´¼ ¡ 1) + ´²(´¤¼ ¡ 1)
´¼(´¤¼ ¡ 1) + ´¼´¤² + ´¤¼´²
:
Under ´¼ = ´
¤
¼, the following still holds even if both ´² and ´
¤
² are positive:
¼0(R) =
1
´¼
; R¤
0
(R) = 1; ²0(R) = 0; and r0(R) =
´¼ ¡ 1
´¼
:
That is, heterogeneity of monetary policy as a source of °uctuation in currency's
value is a condition for which the responses to the depreciation rate, ´² and ´
¤
² , have
a signi¯cant e®ect. If in°ation rates are lower under passive interest rate control in
both countries and ´¼ < ´
¤
¼ < 1, a decrease in the nominal interest rate in Country
2 is larger so that Country 1's currency is depreciated as described in Section 2.3,
making the nominal rate in Country 1 higher if ´² > 0. Then, R and R
¤ can move
in opposite directions, that is, when ´² is su±ciently strong, R
¤0(R) < 0 may hold
even though ´¼ < ´
¤
¼ < 1.
In addition, the real interest rate surely increases with the nominal rate only
if both countries adopt active monetary policy. Otherwise, the sign of r0(R) is
ambiguous, and thus the relation between economic stability and monetary policy
may be more complicated, although the reduced form of the system equation is
apparently the same as in (44):
Proposition 5 Under assertive interest rate controls with positive response to the
depreciation rate of currency in two countries, equilibrium is determinate when ¾ <
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1 and ¾¤ < 1, while it is indeterminate if both ¾ and ¾¤ exceed 1. Otherwise,
equilibrium can be determinate or indeterminate.
4.2 Generalized Taylor Rule
Next, we investigate the e®ect on equilibrium determinacy from Taylor rules such
that central banks respond to both in°ation and production in each country:
R = R(¼) = ´¼(¼ ¡ ¹¼) + ´y(y1 ¡ ¹y1) + ¹R; ´¼ ¸ 0; ´y ¸ 0; (48)
R¤ = R¤(¼¤) = ´¤¼(¼
¤ ¡ ¹¼¤) + ´¤y(y¤2 ¡ ¹y¤2) + ¹R¤; ´¤¼ ¸ 0; ´¤y ¸ 0: (49)
This is an original style suggested in Taylor (1993). Note that ¹y1 and ¹y
¤
2 are the
steady-state values of output, not the levels of the natural rate. From the non-
arbitrage condition (26) and the reduced forms of labor (42) and (43), we obtain
R¤(R; ¸; ¸¤) =
´¤¼
´¤¼ ¡ 1
·
´¼ ¡ 1
´¼
(R¡ ¹R) + ´y
´¼
(fl1(¸; ¸¤)gµ1 ¡ ¹y1)
¡ ´
¤
y
´¤¼
(fl¤2(¸; ¸¤)gµ
¤
2 ¡ ¹y¤2) + ¹R¤
¸
;
and then
_R¤
R¤
=
´¤¼
´¤¼ ¡ 1
·
´¼ ¡ 1
´¼
R
R¤
_R
R
+
1
1¡ µ¤2 + ®(µ¤2 ¡ µ1)
1
R¤
µ
µ1
´y
´¼
y1 ¡ µ¤2
´¤y
´¤¼
y¤2
¶ _¸
¸
¸
: (50)
Combining (45) and (50), we obtain the system equation consisted by one jump
variable R as in the previous sections. The external form is the same as in Equation
(44), but the relation between ¸ and R is not. Concretely,
¸0(R) =
d¸
dR
= ¡
c
(1¡ °)(1¡ ¾)
¾
+ c¤
(1¡ °)(1¡ ¾¤)
¾¤
´¤¼(´¼ ¡ 1)
´¼(´¤¼ ¡ 1)
R
R¤(R)
F (R;R¤; ¸; ¸¤)
¸
R
;
and
r = R¡ ¼(R; ¸; ¸¤) = ´¼ ¡ 1
´¼
(R¡ ¹R) + ´y
´¼
(fl1(¸; ¸¤)gµ1 ¡ ¹y1) + ½;
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hold, where
F (R;R¤; ¸; ¸¤) ´ c
¾
+
c¤
¾¤
+ (c+ c¤)
·
1
1¡ µ¤2 + ®(µ¤2 ¡ µ1)
¡ 1
¸
+
´¤¼
´¤¼ ¡ 1
(1¡ °)(1¡ ¾¤)
¾¤
c¤
R¤
¢ 1
1¡ µ¤2 + ®(µ¤2 ¡ µ1)
µ
µ1
´y
´¼
y1 ¡ µ¤2
´¤y
´¤¼
y¤2
¶
;
and
r0(R) =
dr
dR
=
µ
´¼ ¡ 1
´¼
+
´y
´¼
µ1
1¡ µ¤2 + ®(µ¤2 ¡ µ1)
y1
¸(R)
¸0(R)
¶
:
The approximation of the system equation around the steady state is
_RRjss = r
0( ¹R)¢¸( ¹R)
¡¸0( ¹R)
=
·
´¼ ¡ 1
´¼
1
¡¸0( ¹R) ¡
´y
´¼
µ1
1¡ µ¤2 + ®(µ¤2 ¡ µ1)
¹y1
¸( ¹R)
¸
¸( ¹R);
and the results are summarized in the following propositions and Tables 2 and 3:
Proposition 6 If
µ
µ1
´y
´¼
y1¡ µ¤2
´¤y
´¤¼
y¤2
¶
> 0, indeterminacy emerges when both ¾¤ =
1 and
´¼ ¡ 1
1¡ ¾ < 0 are satis¯ed. Othewise, equilibrium can be either determinate or
indeterminate.
Proposition 7 When
µ
µ1
´y
´¼
y1 ¡ µ¤2
´¤y
´¤¼
y¤2
¶
· 0, ´y > 0, and ´¤y > 0, determinacy
under the zero-response of monetary policy to income may be violated.
To interpret the result, we remember the situation used in Section 3.3. In the
case of
µ
µ1
´y
´¼
y1 ¡ µ¤2
´¤y
´¤¼
y¤2
¶
· 0 such as ´¤y > ´y = 0, the real rate of interest in
Country 2 totally should be higher even if the income decreases so that the essential
mechanism of indeterminacy does not change. On the other hand, the common real
interest rates and thus the nominal rate of interest and consumption in Country 2
may diminish according to smaller income, when
µ
µ1
´y
´¼
y1 ¡ µ¤2
´¤y
´¤¼
y¤2
¶
> 0 such as
´y > ´
¤
y = 0, which can make equilibrium determinate easier if ´y is large enough.
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5 Conclusion
We analyze equilibrium determinacy in a two-country model with heterogeneity in
interest rate control rules, production technologies, and preferences.
This paper shows that monetary policy plays a more important role for stabilizing
economy when heterogeneity exists, because authorities cannot control di®erences
in preferences and technology. We should note that active interest rate adjustments
can generate indeterminate equilibrium, and central banks should be cautious about
the degree of response to in°ation, output, or depreciation rate. Especially, results
suggest that monetary stabilization policies can be designed by utilizing heterogene-
ity of preference and production.
The ¯ndings in this paper suggest several themes for future research, including
the existence of non-traded goods, preference formulations such as an endogenous
time discount rate, habit persistence, or socia-status as in Farmer and Lahiri (2005),
and discrete-time analysis as in Airaudo and Zanna (2005).
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Table 1: Equilibrium determinacy under the standard case in Section 3
¾¤ = 1 ¾ < 1 ¾ > 1 ¾ = 1 ¾¤ < 1 ¾¤ > 1
´¼ > 1 D I ´
¤
¼ > 1 D I
´¼ < 1 I D ´
¤
¼ < 1 I D
¾ < 1; ¾¤ < 1 ´¤¼ < 1 ´
¤
¼ > 1 ¾ < 1; ¾
¤ > 1 ´¤¼ < 1 ´
¤
¼ > 1
´¼ > 1 D, I D ´¼ > 1 D D, I
´¼ < 1 I D, I ´¼ < 1 D, I I
¾ > 1; ¾¤ < 1 ´¤¼ < 1 ´
¤
¼ > 1 ¾ > 1; ¾
¤ > 1 ´¤¼ < 1 ´
¤
¼ > 1
´¼ > 1 I D, I ´¼ > 1 D, I I
´¼ < 1 D, I D ´¼ < 1 D D, I
D = determinate, I = indeterminate
In the case of
µ
µ1
´y
´¼
y1 ¡ µ¤2
´¤y
´¤¼
y¤2
¶
= 0 and ´y > 0, "D" changes "D, I".
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Table 2: Equilibrium determinacy if
µ
µ1
´y
´¼
y1 ¡ µ¤2
´¤y
´¤¼
y¤2
¶
> 0
¾¤ = 1 ¾ < 1 ¾ > 1 ¾ = 1 ¾¤ < 1 ¾¤ > 1
´¼ > 1 D, I I ´
¤
¼ > 1 D, I D, I
´¼ < 1 I D, I ´
¤
¼ < 1 D, I D, I
¾ < 1; ¾¤ < 1 ´¤¼ < 1 ´
¤
¼ > 1 ¾ < 1; ¾
¤ > 1 ´¤¼ < 1 ´
¤
¼ > 1
´¼ > 1 D, I D, I ´¼ > 1 D, I D, I
´¼ < 1 D, I D, I ´¼ < 1 D, I D, I
¾ > 1; ¾¤ < 1 ´¤¼ < 1 ´
¤
¼ > 1 ¾ > 1; ¾
¤ > 1 ´¤¼ < 1 ´
¤
¼ > 1
´¼ > 1 D, I D, I ´¼ > 1 D, I D, I
´¼ < 1 D, I D, I ´¼ < 1 D, I D, I
D = determinate, I = indeterminate
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Table 3: Equilibrium determinacy if
µ
µ1
´y
´¼
y1 ¡ µ¤2
´¤y
´¤¼
y¤2
¶
< 0
¾¤ = 1 ¾ < 1 ¾ > 1 ¾ = 1 ¾¤ < 1 ¾¤ > 1
´¼ > 1 D I ´
¤
¼ > 1 D, I I
´¼ < 1 I D ´
¤
¼ < 1 I D, I
¾ < 1; ¾¤ < 1 ´¤¼ < 1 ´
¤
¼ > 1 ¾ < 1; ¾
¤ > 1 ´¤¼ < 1 ´
¤
¼ > 1
´¼ > 1 D, I D, I ´¼ > 1 D, I D, I
´¼ < 1 I D, I ´¼ < 1 D, I I
¾ > 1; ¾¤ < 1 ´¤¼ < 1 ´
¤
¼ > 1 ¾ > 1; ¾
¤ > 1 ´¤¼ < 1 ´
¤
¼ > 1
´¼ > 1 I D, I ´¼ > 1 D, I I
´¼ < 1 D, I D, I ´¼ < 1 D, I D, I
D = determinate, I = indeterminate
When ´y is positive, "D" changes "D, I".
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